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Figure 4.1 T he Vijr.cnim in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herr.cgovina, 2008. 
Source: Donna-Lee Frict.c. 
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During the attack on Sarajevo between 1992 and 1995, app roximately 12,000 occupants 
of the city were killed, and about 50,000 were injured? The city was relentlessly bombarded 
from the su rrounding h ills over fo ur long years: as the Bosn ian Serb military comm ander 
Ratko M ladic said, "They can't sleep, so we drive them out of their minds."3 T h is is the 
staggering way in which the citizens of Sarajevo had to live, and die; it is also, as Cornelia 
Sorabji suggests, the legacy of the lives of these people. Part of this legacy includes the 
intended destruction of memory and culture, typified in the obliteration of the Vijef:nica 
(the Serbo-Croatian name for the Sarajevo city hall). This chapter de tails the assault on 
the Vijeenica, and explores whether this and similar acts of cultural desecration are linked 
to intentional group harm and rhus merit a fram ing of genocide. To this end, I explore 
the concept of "cultural genocide" as it evolved in the thinking and writings of Raphael 
L.emkin, inventor of the concept of genocide; how it figured in the framing of the United 
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of G enocide (the 
Genocide Convention) of 1948; and what significance it has held in prosecutions in the 
recen t era of ad hoc tribunals, notably that for the former Yugoslavia. 
And ras Riedlmayer - who testified in July 2003 as an expert witness at the tria l of 
Slobodan Milosevic1 ·- points out that the history of a country is revealed in its build-
ings.5 In the case of Sarajevo, the proximity of ch urches to synagogues and mosques 
demonstrates powerfully the city's history of cultural heritage and religious tolerance, 
and reflects the multicultu ral life of its c itizens. 
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The Vijefnica was built in 1896 during the Austro-Hungarian rule over Sarajevo. 
It was purposely designed by the Viennese architect, Karl Wittek, to stand "near the 
first Islamic religious structures built in the fifteenth century."6 After the Second World 
War, the Vije!:nica became the national library of Bosnia and Herzegovina, housing 
works from destroyed libraries from the First World War, including Croatian, Russian 
colonial, and German libraries. It later incorporated works from the Muslim, Croatian, 
and Serbian cultural societies. In 1949, it came to house the archives and holdings of 
the library of the University of Sarajevo/ reflecting Sarajevo's culturally and intellectually 
diverse society. 
The Vijdnica was specifically and repeatedly attacked on August 25-27, 1992. No 
other buildings in rhe vicinity were targeted on those nights, and the only other areas 
to be hit were the streets surrounding the building - a tactic to ensure that rhe fire 
department could not gain access to quench the fl.ames.8 The intent to destroy the 
cultural landscape was explicit. The burning of the Vijeenica was possibly the "largest 
single incident of deliberate book-burning in modern history. "9 The attack came from 
Serbian forces in the surrounding hills of Sarajevo, using incendiary shells and targeting 
the domed roof, so that the inferno flared in the skies for days. Kemal Bakarsic, the 
former chief librarian from the National Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina, wrote: 
"Catching a page you could feel its heat, and for a moment re.1.d a fragment of text in a 
strange kind of black and grey negative, until, as the heat dissipated, the page melted 
tO dust in your hand." 10 
The Vijetnica "contained three million items including rare books and manuscripts, 
maps, recordings and one million volumes .. . [depicting] the languages of ... Bosnia." 
Some archives were irreplaceable, such as "625 Bosnian periodicals" dating fi·om the 
nineteenth century, and precious incunabula. 11 Ninety percent of the 1.5 to 2 million 
items in the archives and holdings were destroyed, 12 including 6,000 rare manuscripts13 
and the only copy of the library's catalogue. In addition, rhe assault destroyed 
irreplaceable death, birth and marriage records that documented individuals' heritage, 
history, and lineage. 14 According to one witness, prior to the attack, staff at the Vijeenica 
had repeatedly requested un.used atomic bomb shelters to store the library's treasures, but 
the authorities ignored their petitions. 15 
Of course, the Vijecnica was not the only building or archive destroyed during the 
siege. Many mosques, libraries, cultural buildings, Jewish and Muslim cemeteries and 
monuments of worship were deliberately obliterated in acts of fanatical nationalism. The 
Oriental Institute, said to house "the largest collection ofislamic, Jewish and Ottoman 
documents in southeastern Europe," was also desecrated, as were the Bosnian National 
Museum and National Archives of Herzegovina, the Academy of Music, the library at 
the University of Mostar, the National Gallery, and 1 ,000 mosques all over Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, in an attempt to "annihilate all Islamic cultural insti tutions." 16 
Significance of the destruction 
The metaphor of book burning resonated deeply with the people of Sarajevo. One of 
the many firefighters to risk his life trying to save the library commented that he was 
putting his life in danger because "they are burning a part of me." 17 For others, the act 
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of culmral destruction, but in particular book burning, aims at the annihilation of group 
identification, or ro "erase our remembrance of who we are." 18 What is clear is that 
many Sarajevans intimately experienced a cataclysmic rupture of their groups' tangible 
and intangible cultural legacy. As James Raven writes, "Libraries can be national, 
institutional or familial treasures in which the guardianship offered by the library is a 
crucial feature. "19 In this respect, libraries, which includes their holdings and their 
communal, intellectual, and spatial arenas, are linked to groups' identity. The burning 
of the volumes and the destruction of the physical space are more than Stephen 
Schwartz's description of "an act of vandalism. "20 
The library's volumes also vividly exemplified the multi-ethnic coexistence at the heart 
of many Sarajevans' collective identity. They were, as Riedlmayer points out, proof of the 
"historical roots" of Muslims, Catholics, and Jews in Bosnia and Herzegovina.2 1 A 
witness to the inferno, the intrepid journalist Robert Fisk, wrote: "Sifting through the 
ashes, I found a scorched fi ling cabinet entirely filled with reference cards to books in 
Esperanto. Could there have been a more moving indication, among the embers, of 
Sarajevo's desire to speak across frontiers?"22 
Among the holdings destroyed by the Serbs were many precious and rare Serbian 
texts. As Riedlmayer argues, the short-term aim of the destruction of tangible and 
intangible cultural elements was part of a campaign of intimidation. But it also reflected 
a complex kind of self-destruction.23 In attempting to erase the ethnic memory of the 
Catholic, Muslim, and Jewish populations, the Serbs crippled their own Bosnian 
heritage, destroying the Serbian literature that filled the high shelves of the library. Sanja 
Zgonjanin argues that the Serbs committed "cultural suicide" by destroying part of their 
own culture, an "ironic" aspect of the assault. 24 But there was a logic to this: the narrative 
of multicultural intricacies contradicted the rhetoric of extreme nationalism proclaimed 
by the perpetrators. Destroying it was a kind of confirmation of the allegedly "age-old" 
ethnic hatreds to which the perpetrators subscribed.25 A similar strategy prevailed in 
rhe Serb destruction of churches, mosques, and bridges.26 For Schwartz, it was not the 
history of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina that the Serbs targeted, but rather the 
proof of coexistence: the "evidence that Serbs had once held property alongside 
Muslims. "27 The Vijdnica housed works that dated back to the Ottoman and Habsburg 
eras, verifying that "its inhabitants of whatever background (were] able not simply to live 
next to but also with each other."28 In mid-1993, the director of the library stated that 
the Bosnian Serb Forces "knew that if they wanted to destroy this multi-ethnic society, 
they would have to destroy the library. "29 
Additionally, as the University of Sarajevo library, the Vijdnica was loved for more 
than its tangible qualities, including the building and its contents. As Ferida Durakovic 
explains: "This was the place to exchange opinions ... where everything began for 
me as a poer."30 Thc Vijef:nica was a meeting ground for intellectuals, promoting a sense 
of cultural community that forms the core of a group. As historians from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina have written, destroying such archives demonstrates a "murder of memory" 
that encompasses not only the collective ethnic memory and heritage of a group, but also 
its intellectuallife.3 1 
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CULTURAL DESTRUCTION : LEGAL PRECEDENTS 
Although the protection of such intangible qualities has a short history, the international 
legal safeguard of tangible cultural heritage dates back to the 1800s. There are no distinct 
laws that specifically mandate prosecution for destroying archives and libraries, but a 
range of codes and conventions do exist for the protection of such property.32 The 1863 
Lieber Code,33 adopted in the Unired States during rhe Civil War, was arguably the first 
law explicitly to protect cultural institutions. Others included the 1874 Brussels 
D eclararion;34 the 1992 UNESCO Memory of the World Programme, which aimed 
"at preservation and dissemination of valuable archive holdings and library collections 
worldwide" ;35 and the 1977 Protocols added to rhe 194-9 Geneva Conventions, 
prohibi ting hostility toward the spiritual and cultural heritage of people.36 None of the 
international declarations and conventions has, however, p roved to be effective in 
prosecuting t:he perpetrators of such acts of destructionY 
The 1954 H ague Convention for the Protection of C ultural Propeny in the Event 
of Armed Conflict is considered the key legal document protecting cultural property 
in an armed conflict, due to its broad inclusion of cultural objects and irs recognition 
of internationalism. Prosecution, however, is rare: as Zgonjanin notes, after the destruc-
tion of cultural property, many communities focus on rebuilding efforts rather than 
pursuing perpetrators.-~8 It is likely that this convention was born from the destruction 
of cultural property during the H olocaust, and it may have also arisen from heated 
discussions in the United Nations, outlined below, regarding cultural destruction in the 
lead-up to the ratification of the Genocide Convention.39 
It is worrh noting that an individual was first prosecuted for mass confiscation of 
cultural p roperty and destruction of cultural heritage in the Nuremberg trials.40 The 
Nuremberg Tribunal's reference to "attacks and appropriarion of cultural property" did 
no t, however, treat attacks on cultural property as singular or atypical, or linked to an 
intent to destroy a human collectivity.41 As such, the "destruction and appropriation of 
property"42 is considered a war crime, but legally speaking, not a crime of genocide per 
the Genocide Convention. Present as an advisor to the United States Chief Prosecutor 
ar the court of the International Mil itary Tribunal at N uremberg, however, was Raphael 
Lemkin, inventor of the concept of genocide. And for Lemkin, such acts of cultural 
destruction had long been central to his evolving understanding of crimes of"vandalism" 
and "barbarity," climaxing in rhe concept of "genocide'' which he had first unveiled a 
year before the Nuremberg trials began, and which would become the basis for an 
international convention only four years later. 
~ LEMKIN AND THE CONCEPT OF GENOCIDAL CULTURAL DESTRUCTION \'\>.,... .. .. .. .. .. ····· ···· ····· .. .... .. . . ... .. ..... . .. .. ... . .......... ....... ... .... . ...... . 
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From an early age, Lemkin was outraged by the "colossal paradox" that while domestic 
law punished attempts to destroy individuals, there was no equivalent legislation to 
outlaw the destruction of human groups.43 Influenced by historical case studies of 
genocide and those that occurred during his lifetime (such as the Armenian genocide 
and the attempted obliteration of the Assyrians in Iraq in 1933), Lemkin was further 
energized to establish an international treaty against group destruction when Hider 
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THE DEST RUCTION OF SARAJEVO'S VIJECNICA 
became Chancellor of Germany in January 1933. Lemkin submitted a draft law to the 
Fifth International Conference for the Unification ofPenal Law in Madrid in 1933 that 
detailed two distinct actions: "Acts of Barbarity and Acts of Vandalism." The firs t 
described bodily harm to a specific group, while the second Lemkin described as the 
"malicious destruction of works of art and culture. "H T his demonstrates that Lemkin's 
early thoughts on genocide were concerned with the cultural destruction of groups as 
an essential component of genocide. However, as the majority of Lemkin's work has 
remained unpublished, little is known about his subsequent thinking, which evolved 
into his concept of genocide. This chapter uses Lemkin's archival papers to demonstrate 
that genocidal cultural destruction remained a vital component of his thinking, both 
before and after the adoption of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Indeed, until the end 
of his life in 1959 - including eleven long years after the convention's adoption- Lemkin 
continued to advocate the importance of cultural destruction as an integral element of 
genocide. 
According to Zgonjanin, the purpose of all cultural destruction is "to erase ethnic, 
religious, and cultmal memories and therefore to undermine or eliminate groups' 
identities and existence. "45 For Lemkin, however, not all cases of culrural destruction 
could be deemed genocidal. The intention to obliterate a particular group's cul ture was 
only genocidal when its aim was "to erase ethnic, rel igious, and cultural memories and 
therefore to undermine or eliminate groups' identities and existence."46 Lemkin noted 
(precisely when is uncertain, given that many of his archival papers are undated) that 
"cultural genocide is the most important part of the Convention,"4'1 because it under-
pinned the intentionality of serious bodily, mental , or biological harm to a group 
outlawed in Article II of the Genocide Convention. For Lemkin, intentional and forceful 
religious conversions, as well as the transfer of children banned by Article II (e) of the 
convention, in particular, amounted to genocide of group cu!ture.48 He wrote: "Cultural 
genocide need not necessarily involve the substitution of new culture traits .. . but may 
maliciously undermine the victim group to render its members more defenseless in the 
face of physical destruction."49 Again, Lemkin inserts the word "maliciously" to under-
score the purposeful nature of the crime. 
In his later years, Lemkin clearly distinguished between "the gradual changes a culture 
may undergo" -what he called "cultural diffusion" (or assimilation of culture)- and cul-
tural genocidal destruction, a point also raised by the objectors to the addition of 
cultural groups, in the Genocide Convention at the cultural genocide debate at the 
United Nations in 1948 (examined further below). Embracing the notion of assimilated 
cultures, Lemkin argued that without such diffusion, "the culture becomes static." Even 
rhough some cultures may disappear through such an assimilat ion process, cultural 
diffusion clearly, for Lcmkin, did not equate to genocide; it was rather "relatively gradual 
and spontaneous." This cultural assimilation contrasted with absorptions of culture 
that were abrupt, and in Lemkin's words "implie[d) complete and violent change."This 
mode, which consisted of calculated attacks on culture and memory, is what Lemkin 
described as "surgical operations on cultures and deliberate assassination of civi lizations," 
tantamount ro genocide. 5° It was, above all, the "pre-meditated goal" of the perpetrators 
which linked the concept of cultural genocide to genocidal intent. 51 
Lemkin relied on the disciplines of sociology and, in particular, anthropology to 
explain and understand the significance of culmral genocidal destruction. The mingling 
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of cultures in close proximity was, for him, a sign of hope for civilization. 52 He called 
both for respect for cultural relativity, and for tolerance of the universal values of 
basic human rights. His handwritten notes suggest that this hope for worldwide accep-
tance of cultural diversity and universality is possibly contradictory and therefore 
problematic. 53 
As we will see in detail below, however, while vestiges of his emphasis on cultural 
genocide are evident in the Genocide Convention, Lemkin failed to persuade the drafters 
of the convention explicitly to incorporate cultural destruction as a form of genocide. 
Long after the convention was ratified, however, he was still appealing fervently for 
culture as a component of genocide to be understood as an essential element of the crime. 
In a mid- I 950s imerview for Italian radio, Lemkin declared: 
Genocide is a very atrocious crime. It destroys nations, races and religious groups 
and deprives the world of [o] riginal contributions of the particular peoples. World 
culture is like a concerto to which every nation contributes through its own culture, 
bringing in its own tone and cultural aroma. Genocide has followed the h istory of · 
mankind like an ominous shadow. It has destroyed lives and cultures, it has brutalized 
so many times entire generations, it has deprived the world of sensitivities and human 
love. Now the United Nations has decided to do away with this shadow and to secure 
the international world for life and culture. 54 
There are two aspects to Lemkin's arguments concerning cultural genocide. One is that 
cul tural destruction can be an intrinsic element of genocide through irs connection to 
the sociological aspect of the crime. The ocher is that the outlawing of genocide is 
essential for the preservation of humanity's cultural element. He wrote in 1957 that 
genocide "has caused irretrievable losses because culture by its very nature can be neither 
restored nor duplicated."55 As Nicholas Adams observes in relation to the cultural sires 
across Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, the destruction was predominantly targeted 
toward "the places where people gather to live out their collective life."56 As Lemkin 
understood, there is no "collective life" when tangible and intangible aspects of a group's 
culture are decimated. 57 
In the lead-up to the adoption of the Genocide Convention by the United Nations, 
Lemkin frantically attempted to co nvince delegates that the inclusion of the cultural 
component of genocide had a preventative aspect to ir. In a September 1948 letter to 
the C hairman of the Genocide Committee, James Rosenberg, Lemkin pointed to rhe 
Venezuelan delegate's argument that cultural destruction could act as a prelude to 
intended physical destruction. Lemkin highlighted the examples of the "mass destruc- . 
tion of synagogues by Hitler in 1938 . .. and the mass destruction of the Christian 
Armenian Churches prior to the extermination of a million Armenians." He wrote: 
"Burning books is not the same as burning bodies, but when one intervenes in time 
against mass destruction of churches and books one arrives just in time to prevent , 
the burning of bodies. "58 By October 1948, the delegates had voted and voiced their final 
opinions on rhe inclusion of cultural destruction in a convention on genocide. Lemkin's 
arguments regarding cultural destruction as a preventative tool for physical destruc-
tion were unrealized, but his understanding of the correlation between cultural 
destruction and intended physical and biological destruction remains pertinent. 
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Cultural destruction and the UN Genocide Convention 
Why and how did the concept of cultural genocidal destruction, which was cen tral to 
the earliest framings of the Genocide Convention, come to be excluded from that same 
legal instrument? The following brief account analyzes the reasons for and against the 
exclusion of cultural destruction as an act enumerated in the convention. 
T he Genocide Convention was the product of two separate drafts, evaluated and 
combined by different committees. Illuminating debates on the issue of cul tural 
destruction occurred between April and May 1948 on the second draft, in the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Genocide, which defined cultural genocide (covered in Article III) as: 
any deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the language, religion, or 
culture of a national, racial or religious group on grounds of nat ional o r racial o rigin 
or religious belief [,] such as: 
prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in 
schools, or the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the 
group; 
2 destroying, or preventing the use of, libraries, m useums, schools, h isto rical 
monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and objects of the 
group. 59 
Representatives of seven nation-states decided upon the f1te of cultural destruction as 
an element of genocide in this Assembly: the United States, the USSR, Lebanon, C hina, 
France, Poland, and Venezuela.60 Despite the objections from some nation-states, the 
Assembly decided on April5, 1948, by six votes co one, to retain the concept of cultural 
dcstruction.61 
Later, in October 1948, the Assembly deliberated for th ree hours over the inclusion 
of Article III in the convention . During the discussions, Sardar Bahadur Khan from 
Pakistan reasoned that the cultural destruction of a group could not be separated from 
physical or biological destruction; and, further, chat the defining characteristics of a 
group were embedded in the crime's cultural composition and expression: 
Cultural genocide represented the end, whereas physical genocide was merely the 
m eans. T he chief motive of genocide was blind rage to destroy the ideas, the values 
and the very soul of a national, racial or religious group, rather than its physical 
existence. 62 
However, some delegates maintained that including cultural genocidal descrucrion in the 
convention might restrict the number of countries willing to ratify it. Accordingly, Khan 
suggested that sub-paragraph 1 of Article III should be deleted, as such a provision 
broadened the concept of genocide; but he declared that sub-paragraph 2 was essential, 
"otherwise, the convention would only partially achieve its aim. "63 Responding co 
complaints tha t the definition of cultural genocide was equivocal and ambiguous,64 
Venezuelan member Perez Perozo, the Syrian delegate Tarazi, Jose Correa from Ecuador, 
and Wahid Raafac from Egypt also agreed that Article III should be made less vague in 
order to win support from the delegates.65 
63 
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One of the more rigorous arguments was that oflranian delegate Ojala! Abdoh. He 
asked whether, under the convention, all cultures should be preserved, even barbaric 
ones. How would a government "determine the concrete elements of a group's religion 
and culture?" The Union of South Africa questioned the tolerance of, for instance, 
cannibalism. 66 
Sture Perren of Sweden stared that the protection of cultural destruction belonged 
with an instrument on minority rights, and asked whether "the fact that Sweden had 
converted the Lapps to Christianity might not lay her open to the accusation thar she 
had committed an act of cultural genocide."67 Against cultural genocide as a minority 
rights issue, Khan and Tsien Tai from China reasoned that if cultural destruction were 
included only in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (as the Canadian and 
Indian delegates proposed) , the Genocide Convention would be reduced to a rhetorical 
statement, rather than a foundation for international jurisprudence; it would therefore 
lack moral authority.68 Alexander Morozov from the USSR offered a similar argument · 
with a different theoretical underpinning: the right to life, security, and liberty enshrined 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "might be interpreted as ensuring ... 
protection against any act of physical genocide; yet no one disputed the need for a 
convention on physical genocide."69 Likewise, some delegates opposed to the inclusion 
of cultural genocide maintained that there was no need for an international legal ·. 
document on genocide, as provisions for such crimes were already enacted in national 
or domestic legislation.7° Perozo, however, contended that many civilized nation-states . 
penalized most of the acts specified in the draft convention.71 
Certain nation-states contended that a genocide convention equating cultural · 
genocidal destruction (in other words, a "less hideous crime") with intentional physical 
and biological destruction would broaden the interpretation of the crime and "might ' 
give rise to abuses by reason of the vagueness" of rhe concept.72 Many states thus 
established a hierarchy of genocidal acts, asserting that physical and bio logical genocide . 
were more heinous than cultural genocide, and that this lesser act should be confined 
to debates over minority rights- as if somehow the protection of minorities was an 
insignificant issue, and safeguarding the culture of majorities mattered little.73 Ernest 
Gross from the United States described the concept of cultural genocidal destruction 
as excessively "far-reaching," and similarly Georges Kaeckenbeek, representing Belgium, 
understood Article III to be an "indefinite extension" of genocide?4 Bahadur Khan, 
however, insisted that this was an archetypal "western" response grounded in "material-
istic philosophies" that accorded insufficient weight to spiritual values,75 while 
Venezuela's Perozo pointed out that the term "destruction" in the convention was not 
limited to physical destruction alone: extinguishing rhe traits or spirit of the group was . 
another way to "deprive rhe group of its existence. "76 Perozo also argued that these "less 
spectacular crimes" of genocide must not be disregarded/ 7 while Ecuador's Correa 
maintained that the outcome and consequences of cultural, physical, and biological 
genocidal destruction were indistinguishable. 78 Moro7..ov of the USSR pointed to the 
recent Nuremberg verdicts, which had demonstrated that cultural destruction in 
Czechoslovakia, Luxembourg and Poland during the Nazi era constituted a form of 
destruction of particular groups.79 
Some members of the Committee equated cultural assimilation with cultural 
genocide, a point explicitly raised and distinguished by Lemkin (see above).80 However, , 
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association of that heritage with rhe targeted group). Judges ... have begun 
recognize this link and have taken such evidence into consideration in their ruli 
on the gravest of charges.89 
Most notably, the relevance of rhe concept of culrmal genocidal destruction moved 
the fore wirh the advent of the two United Nations ad hoc tribunals for the for 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.90 In a h istoric precedent, the International Criminal Tribu 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), prosecuted persons for the destruction of li 
albeit not as a crime of genocide.91 The Trial C hamber understood, if not rhe · 
of the destruction of the Vijecnica, then at the very least, the connection 
"evidence of intem to destroy" and some acts of cultural desecration in the 
region. This is emblematic of a broader understand ing in contemporary inte 
law referenced by John Quigley, who notes that international legal bodies 
increasingly recognized that if any of the acts in Article ll of the Genocide Conven 
is alleged, "the destruction of cultural objectives m ay provide evidence rhat such acts 
done with intent to destroy the group. "92 In the 2004 case against Rad islav Krstic 
of Staff of the Bosnian Serb Army) , for example, the Trial C hamber of the ICTY 
out: 
that where there is physical or biological destruction there are often simul 
attacks on the cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted group 
well, at:tacks which may legitimately be considered as evidence of an intent to 
cally destroy the group. In this case, the Trial Chamber will thus take into a 
as evidence of intent to destroy the group the deliberate destruction of mosques 
houses belonging ro members of the group.93 
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T here are numerous examples - indeed, thousands in recorded history- of acts 
cultural destruction. More ancient instances include the Mongols' sacking of 
and its great libraries in 1258; the Spanish burning of the Aztec and Mayan 
after the Conquest; and the more general devastation of indigenous cultures a . 
languages worldwide. A twentieth-century western example was the destruction of 
Catholic University ofLouvain in Belgium by German forces, fi rst on August 25, 191 
(coincidentally, the same date as the burning of the Vijeenica in 1992) ,9~ and · 
after its reconstruction, by the German army during the Second World War.95 
In my view, however, not all such instances of cultural destruction can or should 
considered genocidal. In the case of the Catholic University, for example, the 
- unlike the Serbs in relation to tbe Bosniaks in 1992, and their dest ruction of 
V~jeenica - were not perpetrating physical or biological genocide against 
Catholics. 'To take another example, the fire that caused the destruction of the 
University Library during the revolution of December 198996 was not genocidal, 
it was not linked to a campaign of intentional destruction of a designated group. It 
this aspect - whether the act of cultural destruction bears a genocidal in tent, 
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it serves as a precursor to physical or biological genocide - that must be decisive in 
rendering a verdict of cultural genocidal desecration. 
Let us consider this element of intent in the case of the Vijefnica. As noted earlier, 
many cultural and religious monuments and buildings were desecrated all over Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. But the destruction of the Vijefnica was an especially meaningful 
event, involving as it did the obliteration of approximately 150,000 rare books97 -
meaningful not only for the Bosnians who acknowledge its pronounced historical and 
cultural significance, but for the instigator of the devastation, who understood the 
profound violation it represented. 
A genocidal intent was manifest in the Serb campaign which included- vitally- the 
Vijefnica's destruction. Speaking in April 1992, Serb Democratic Party Vice President 
Nikola Koljevic made his intent to destroy clear: he said that the Bosnian Serb 
nationalists "should start in Sarajevo and that work on [i .e. destruction of] boundaries 
of 'national communities' should start immediately,"98 meaning that Sarajevo would 
be divided into ethnic territories. Speaking four months before the burning of the 
Vije!:nica, Koljevie's intentions were overt.99 And it was he who, in the end, ordered the 
bombing of the Vijdnica, and "signed the directive ordering Radko M ladic co shell" 
and destroy it. 100 This organized desecration of the Vijef:nica had "logical" conclusions: 
to "maliciously undermine" (see Lemkin's framing, above) all non-Serbian Sarajevans, 
and to weaken the cornerstones of their cultural identity. 
As such, given that this cultural desecration was accompanied by the genocidal 
targeting of non-Serbs, we can discern a clear and quite t raditional genocidal intent. 
However, there is another aspect of the Vijetnica's destruction which renders the action 
even more complex and portentous. 
Koljevic was a highly cultivated man who, as an academic, actually capitalized 
on the scholarly offerings of the Vijebzica. He was, as Raymond Bonner points out, a 
"Shakespearean scholar who ... lectured at numerous American universities . . . 
notably, Stanford and Berkeley," and was often chosen as a spokesperson for the Bosnian 
Serbian position due to his eloquent English and his apparent moderate ideology. 101 
According to a 1992 report, Koljevic was one of the Balkans' most esteemed 
Shakespearian academics. 102 
Why would this Professor oftiterature order and desire such destruction? According 
to Janine eli Giovanni, Koljevic was 
a scholar who loved books, who placed a high premium on intelligence, who believed 
that words could liberate a human being, [then] had raised his hand and one m illion 
books ... were burnt to a crisp. T he library was a symbol of Sarajevo's mul ti-ethnic 
tradition - something that he had come to hate more than anything. 103 
It was not the Austrian-Hungarian building per se that evoked this hatred, but as 
Matthew Battles points out, its contents, specifically its rare Ottoman collections. 104 Nor 
was it incongruous that a professor of li terature should mastermind the bombing of 
books. T he Minister of Health of the Republika Srpska told the Bosnian Serb Assembly 
in May 1992 that he was "for the destruction of Kosova Hospital so that the enemy has 
nowhere to go for medical help,"105 and there are numerous examples in Rwanda, and 
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precedents in the Holocaust and in Cambodia, in which elites or intellectuals 
their knowledge and exploited their skills for genocidal purposes. 
In a broader sense, given his commirmem to the pursuit of knowledge, Kolj 
action seem s to have been se{fdesrrucrive, both on a personal level and with regard 
his e thnic community. Indeed, it is notable that Koljevic finally ki lled h imself, 
January 16, 1995. Perhaps, then, the shelling of the Vijeenica, with its Serbian rreasu 
was also an act of so-called "auro-genocide." This problematic term was coined 
French journalist, Jean L<courure, in relation to Cambodians supposedly commi 
acts of self-destruction during the 1970s. 106 Lacouture implied that the acts co 
in Cambodia were not genocide: how can acts be considered as such when the 
trators intend self-destruction? Although the term is riddled with conceptual 
its finer points beg the question: what happens when a group intentionally attempts 
destroy itself, its history and its culture? As established, KoljeviC's intentions to 
all Sarajevans through the destruction of the library are arguably clear. H owever, is 
crime still genocide when the perpetrators' intent is to destroy themselves? There is 
stipulation in the Genocide Convention which states that perpetrators cannot o 
themselves. Surely, this is the existential difficul ty (apart from the e thical compo 
of genocide: when the Nazis destroyed the German Jews, the Hutu ann ihilated the 
the Turks intentionally destroyed the Armenians, and the Khmer Rouge maimed 
tortured the Cambodians, they were all destroying and transforming their societies 
cultures. The perpetrators' illusion is that they believed rhey were somehow "cleansi 
themselves as well. 
~~ CONCLUSION 
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In this chap ter I began by describing the devastation of cultural destruction in 
Bosnian genocide, with a focus on Sarajevo's most significant cultural monument, 
symbolized the intellectual and multi-ethnic nature of the region. The core 
focused on the problematic inclusion or exclusion of cultural destruction in the 
of genocide, and demonstrated that rather than being a relatively recent addition 
scho larly a rguments, the concept has historical precedents that date back to the 
cussions of the 1940s in the newly formed United Nations. Despite the vote to 
the notion of culture from the Genocide Convention, Lemkin continued to argue 
its p l?-ce in the conceptual understanding of genocide long after the ratification of 
Convention in 1951. By returning to his archival writings, scholars of genocide 
may appreciate the centrali ty of culture in Lemkin's thinking on genocide. 
As I have argued, not all form s of cultural destruction are genocidal. H owever, 
there is a link, the aspect of the intent underlying the crime must be closely analyzed. 
case of Koljevic highlights the fact that the destruction of certain cultural · · 
can be a sign of an intention to destroy a particular group, physically, biologically, 
psychologically; and that cultural destruction is in some instances not "'"'"'···"'""' 
genocide, but is inherent within genocide, regardless of the so-called 
arguments of "auto-genocide". 
It is heartening that despite the exclusion of explicit mention of cultural 
in the Genocide Convention, the ICTY came to recognize that cultural destruction 
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provide a clue to intentional physical, biological, or mental group harm, thus illumin-
ating the preventive aspect of the crime. Although the concept of cultural destruction 
has historically been linked to war crimes and crimes against humanity, the perpetrators' 
deliberate destruction of the Vijdnica, with the concomitant intent of physical and 
biological destruction of an out-group, shows that in some cases, and this case in par-
ticular, cultural destruction is fundamental to the core acts of genocide. As international 
criminal law is beginning to absorb Lemkin's understanding of the crime, it is time to 
return to Lemkin's nuanced concepts in order to deepen, rather than broaden, our 
understanding of genocide . 
A shorter version of this chapter was presented at the International Association of Genocide 
Scholars conference at George Mason University, Washington, DC, in 2009. Many thanks 
to my colleagues who presented with me on this panel on cultural genocidal destruction: 
Peter Balakian, Jutta Lindert, and Armen Marsoobian. I also express gratitude to various 
members of the audience for their helpful comments and especially to Adam Jones and 
Pam Maclean for rheir insightful readings and comments. 
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